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Abstract
The Gaussian mechanism is an essential building block used in multitude of differentially
private data analysis algorithms. In this paper we revisit the Gaussian mechanism and show that
the original analysis has several important limitations. Our analysis reveals that the variance
formula for the original mechanism is far from tight in the high privacy regime (ε → 0) and
it cannot be extended to the low privacy regime (ε → ∞). We address these limitations by
developing an optimal Gaussian mechanism whose variance is calibrated directly using the
Gaussian cumulative density function instead of a tail bound approximation. We also propose
to equip the Gaussian mechanism with a post-processing step based on adaptive estimation
techniques by leveraging that the distribution of the perturbation is known. Our experiments
show that analytical calibration removes at least a third of the variance of the noise compared to
the classical Gaussian mechanism, and that denoising dramatically improves the accuracy of the
Gaussian mechanism in the high-dimensional regime.
1 Introduction
Output perturbation is a cornerstone of mechanism design in differential privacy (DP). Well-known
mechanisms in this class are the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms Dwork et al. [2006], Dwork and
Roth [2014]. More complex mechanisms are often obtained by composing multiple applications of
these basic output perturbation mechanisms. For example, the Laplace mechanism is the basic
building block of the sparse vector mechanism Dwork et al. [2009], and the Gaussian mechanism is
the building block of private empirical risk minimization algorithms based on stochastic gradient
descent Bassily et al. [2014]. Analysing the privacy of such complex mechanisms turns out to be
a delicate and error-prone task Lyu et al. [2017]. In particular, obtaining tight privacy analyses
leading to optimal utility is one of the main challenges in the design of advanced DP mechanisms.
An alternative to tight a-priori analyses is to equip complex mechanisms with algorithmic noise
calibration and accounting methods. These methods use numerical computations to, e.g. calibrate
perturbations and compute cumulative privacy losses at run time, without relying on hand-crafted
worst-case bounds. For example, recent works have proposed methods to account for the privacy
loss under compositions occurring in complex mechanisms Rogers et al. [2016], Abadi et al. [2016].
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In this work we revisit the Gaussian mechanism and develop two ideas to improve the utility
of output perturbation DP mechanisms based on Gaussian noise. The first improvement is an
algorithmic noise calibration strategy that uses numerical evaluations of the Gaussian cumulative
density function (CDF) to obtain the optimal variance to achieve DP using Gaussian perturbation.
The analysis and the resulting algorithm are provided in Section 3. In order to motivate the need
for a numerical approach to calibrate the noise of a DP Gaussian perturbation mechanism, we
start with an analysis of the main limitations of the classical Gaussian mechanism in Section 2. A
numerical evaluation provided in Section 5.1 showcases the advantages of our optimal calibration
procedure.
The second improvement equips the Gaussian perturbation mechanism with a post-processing
step which denoises the output using adaptive estimation techniques from the statistics literature.
Since DP is preserved by post-processing and the distribution of the perturbation added to the
desired outcome is known, this allows a mechanism to achieve the desired privacy guarantee while
increasing the accuracy of the released value. The relevant denoising estimators and their utility
guarantees are discussed in Section 4. Results presented in this section are not new: they are the
product of a century’s worth of research in statistical estimation. Our contribution is to compile
relevant results scattered throughout the literature in a single place and showcase their practical
impact in synthetic (Section 5.2) and real (Section 5.3) datasets, thus providing useful pointers and
guidelines for practitioners.
2 Limitations of the Classical Gaussian Mechanism
Let X be an input space equipped with a symmetric neighbouring relation x ' x′. Let ε ≥ 0 and
δ ∈ [0, 1] be two privacy parameters. A Y-valued randomized algorithm M : X → Y is (ε, δ)-DP
Dwork et al. [2006] if for every pair of neighbouring inputs x ' x′ and every possible (measurable)
output set E ⊆ Y the following inequality holds:
P[M(x) ∈ E] ≤ eεP[M(x′) ∈ E] + δ . (1)
The definition of DP captures the intuition that a computation on private data will not reveal
sensitive information about individuals in a dataset if removing or replacing an individual in the
dataset has a negligible effect in the output distribution.
In this paper we focus on the family of so-called output perturbation DP mechanisms. An
output perturbation mechanism M for a deterministic vector-valued computation f : X → Rd is
obtained by computing the function f on the input data x and then adding random noise sampled
from a random variable Z to the output. The amount of noise required to ensure the mechanism
M(x) = f(x) +Z satisfies a given privacy guarantee typically depends on how sensitive the function
f is to changes in the input and the specific distribution chosen for Z. The Gaussian mechanism
gives a way to calibrate a zero mean isotropic Gaussian perturbation Z ∼ N (0, σ2I) to the global
L2 sensitivity ∆ = supx'x′ ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖ of f as follows.
Theorem 1 (Classical Gaussian Mechanism). For any ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), the Gaussian output perturbation
mechanism with σ = ∆
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/ε is (ε, δ)-DP.
A natural question one can ask about this result is whether this value of σ provides the minimal
amount of noise required to obtain (ε, δ)-DP with Gaussian perturbations. Another natural question
is what happens in the case ε ≥ 1. This section addresses both these questions. First we show
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that the value of σ given in Theorem 1 is suboptimal in the high privacy regime ε→ 0. Then we
show that this problem is in fact inherent to the usual proof strategy used to analyze the Gaussian
mechanism. We conclude the section by showing that for large values of ε the standard deviation of
a Gaussian perturbation that provides (ε, δ)-DP must scale like Ω(1/
√
ε). This implies that the
scaling Θ(1/ε) provided by the classical Gaussian mechanism in the range ε ∈ (0, 1) cannot be
extended beyond any bounded interval.
2.1 Limitations in the High Privacy Regime
To illustrate the sub-optimality of the classical Gaussian mechanism in the regime ε→ 0 we start by
showing it is possible to achieve (0, δ)-DP using Gaussian perturbations. This clearly falls outside
the capabilities of the classical Gaussian mechanism, since the standard deviation σ = Θ(1/ε)
provided by Theorem 1 grows to infinity as ε→ 0.
Theorem 2. A Gaussian output perturbation mechanism with σ = ∆/2δ is (0, δ)-DP1.
Previous analyses of the Gaussian mechanism are based on a simple sufficient condition for DP
in terms of the privacy loss random variable Dwork and Roth [2014]. The next section explains why
the usual analysis of the Gaussian mechanism cannot yield tight bounds for the regime ε→ 0. This
shows that our example is not a corner case, but a fundamental limitation of trying to establish
(ε, δ)-DP through said sufficient condition.
2.2 Limitations of Privacy Loss Analyses
Given a vector-valued mechanism M let pM(x)(y) denote the density of the random variable
Y = M(x). The privacy loss function of M on a pair of neighbouring inputs x ' x′ is defined as
`M,x,x′(y) = log
(
pM(x)(y)
pM(x′)(y)
)
.
The privacy loss random variable LM,x,x′ = `M,x,x′(Y ) is the transformation of the output random
variable Y = M(x) by the function `M,x,x′ . For the particular case of a Gaussian mechanism
M(x) = f(x) + Z with Z ∼ N (0, σ2I) it is well-known that the privacy loss random variable is also
Gaussian Dwork and Rothblum [2016].
Lemma 3. The privacy loss LM,x,x′ of a Gaussian output perturbation mechanism follows a
distribution N (η, 2η) with η = D2/2σ2, where D = ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖.
The privacy analysis of the classical Gaussian mechanism relies on the following sufficient
condition: a mechanism M is (ε, δ)-DP if the privacy loss LM,x,x′ satisfies
∀x ' x′ : P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε] ≤ δ . (2)
Since Lemma 3 shows the privacy loss LM,x,x′ of the Gaussian mechanism is a Gaussian random
variable with mean ‖f(x) − f(x′)‖2/2σ2, we have P[LM,x,x′ > 0] ≥ 1/2 for any pair of datasets
with f(x) 6= f(x′). This observation shows that in general it is not possible to use this sufficient
condition for (ε, δ)-DP to prove that the Gaussian mechanism achieves (0, δ)-DP for any δ < 1/2.
In other words, the sufficient condition is not necessary in the regime ε→ 0. We conclude that an
alternative analysis is required in order to improve the dependence on ε in the Gaussian mechanism.
1Proofs for all results given in the paper are presented in Appendix A.
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2.3 Limitations in the Low Privacy Regime
The last question we address in this section is whether the order of magnitude σ = Θ(1/ε) given by
Theorem 1 for ε ≤ 1 can be extended to privacy parameters of the form ε > 1. We show this is not
the case by providing the following lower bound.
Theorem 4. Let f : X → Rd have global L2 sensitivity ∆. Suppose ε > 0 and 0 < δ < 1/2 −
e−3ε/
√
4piε. If the mechanism M(x) = f(x) +Z with Z ∼ N (0, σ2I) is (ε, δ)-DP, then σ ≥ ∆/√2ε.
Note that as ε→∞ the upper bound on δ in Theorem 4 converges to 1/2. Thus, as ε increases
the range of δ’s requiring noise of the order Ω(1/
√
ε) increases to include all parameters of practical
interest. This shows that the rate σ = Θ(1/ε) provided by the classical Gaussian mechanism cannot
be extended beyond the interval ε ∈ (0, 1). Note this provides an interesting contrast with the
Laplace mechanism, which can achieve ε-DP with standard deviation Θ(1/ε) in the low privacy
regime.
3 The Analytic Gaussian Mechanism
The limitations of the classical Gaussian mechanism described in the previous section suggest
there is room for improvement in the calibration of the variance of a Gaussian perturbation to
the corresponding global L2 sensitivity. Here we present a method for optimal noise calibration
for Gaussian perturbations that we call analytic Gaussian mechanism. To do so we must address
the two sources of slack in the classical analysis: the sufficient condition (2) used to reduce the
analysis to finding an upper bound for P[N (η, 2η) > ε], and the use of a Gaussian tail approximation
to obtain such upper bound. We address the first source of slack by showing that the sufficient
condition in terms of the privacy loss random variable comes from a relaxation of a necessary and
sufficient condition involving two privacy loss random variables. When specialized to the Gaussian
mechanism, this condition involves probabilities about Gaussian random variables, which instead
of approximating by a tail bound we represent explicitly in terms of the CDF of the standard
univariate Gaussian distribution:
Φ(t) = P[N (0, 1) ≤ t] = 1√
2pi
∫ t
−∞
e−y
2/2dy .
Using this point of view, we introduce a calibration strategy for Gaussian perturbations that requires
solving a simple optimization problem involving Φ(t). We discuss how to solve this optimization at
the end of this section.
The first step in our analysis is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for differential
privacy in terms of privacy loss random variables. This is captured by the following result.
Theorem 5. A mechanism M : X → Y is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if the following holds for every
x ' x′:
P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε]− eεP[LM,x′,x ≤ −ε] ≤ δ . (3)
Note that Theorem 5 immediately implies the sufficient condition given in (2) through the
inequality
P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε]− eεP[LM,x′,x ≤ −ε] ≤ P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε] .
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Now we can use Lemma 3 to specialize (3) for a Gaussian output perturbation mechanism. The
relevant computations are packaged in the following result, where we express the probabilities in (3)
in terms of the Gaussian CDF Φ.
Lemma 6. Suppose M(x) = f(x) + Z is a Gaussian output perturbation mechanism with Z ∼
N (0, σ2I). For any x ' x′ let D = ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖. Then the following hold for any ε ≥ 0:
P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε] = Φ
(
D
2σ
− εσ
D
)
, (4)
P[LM,x′,x ≤ −ε] = Φ
(
−D
2σ
− εσ
D
)
. (5)
This result specializes the left hand side of (3) in terms of the distance D = ‖f(x) − f(x′)‖
between the output means on a pair of neighbouring datasets. To complete the derivation of our
analytic Gaussian mechanism we need to ensure that (3) is satisfied for every pair x ' x′. The next
lemma shows that this reduces to plugging the global L2 sensitivity ∆ in the place of D in (4) and
(5).
Lemma 7. For any ε ≥ 0, the function h : R≥0 → R defined as follows is monotonically increasing:
h(η) = P[N (η, 2η) ≥ ε]− eεP[N (η, 2η) ≤ −ε] .
Now we are ready to state our main result, whose proof follows directly from Theorem 5,
Lemma 7, and equations (4) and (5).
Theorem 8 (Analytic Gaussian Mechanism). Let f : X→ Rd be a function with global L2 sensitivity
∆. For any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the Gaussian output perturbation mechanism M(x) = f(x) + Z
with Z ∼ N (0, σ2I) is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if
Φ
(
∆
2σ
− εσ
∆
)
− eεΦ
(
−∆
2σ
− εσ
∆
)
≤ δ . (6)
This result shows that in order to obtain an (ε, δ)-DP Gaussian output perturbation mechanism
for a function f with global L2 sensitivity ∆ it is enough to find a noise variance σ
2 satisfying (6).
One could now use upper and lower bounds for the tail of the Gaussian CDF to derive an analytic
expression for a parameter σ satisfying this constraint. However, this again leads to a suboptimal
result due to the slack in these tail bounds in the non-asymptotic regime. Instead, we propose to
find σ using a numerical algorithm by leveraging the fact that the Gaussian CDF can be written
as Φ(t) = (1 + erf(t/
√
2))/2, where erf is the standard error function. Efficient implementations
of this function to very high accuracies are provided by most statistical and numerical software
packages. However, this strategy requires some care in order to avoid numerical stability issues
around the point where the expression ∆/2σ − εσ/∆ in (6) changes sign. Thus, we further massage
the left hand side (6) we obtain the implementation of the analytic Gaussian mechanism given in
Algorithm 1. The correctness of this implementation is provided by the following result.
Theorem 9. Let f be a function with global L2 sensitivity ∆. For any ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the
mechanism described in Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-DP.
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Algorithm 1: Analytic Gaussian Mechanism
Public Inputs: f , ∆, ε, δ
Private Inputs: x
Let δ0 = Φ(0)− eεΦ(−
√
2ε)
if δ ≥ δ0 then
Define B+ε (v) = Φ(
√
εv)− eεΦ(−√ε(v + 2))
Compute v∗ = sup{v ∈ R≥0 : B+ε (v) ≤ δ}
Let α =
√
1 + v∗/2−√v∗/2
else
Define B−ε (u) = Φ(−
√
εu)− eεΦ(−√ε(u+ 2))
Compute u∗ = inf{u ∈ R≥0 : B−ε (u) ≤ δ}
Let α =
√
1 + u∗/2 +
√
u∗/2
Let σ = α∆/
√
2ε
Return f(x) +N (0, σ2I)
Given a numerical oracle for computing Φ(t) based on the error function it is relatively straight-
forward to implement a solver for finding the values v∗ and u∗ needed in Algorithm 1. For example,
using the fact that B+ε (v) is monotonically increasing we see that computing v
∗ is a root finding
problem for which one can use Newton’s method since the derivative of Φ(t) can be computed in
closed form using Leibniz’s rule. In practice we find that a simple scheme based on binary search
initiated from an interval obtained by finding the smallest k ∈ N such that B+ε (2k) > δ provides a
very efficient and robust way to find v∗ up to arbitrary accuracies (the same applies to u∗).
4 Optimal Denoising
Can we improve the performance of analytical Gaussian mechanism even further? The answer is
“yes” and “no”. We can’t because Algorithm 1 is already the exact calibration of the Gaussian noise
level to the given privacy budget. But if we consider the problem of designing the best differentially
private procedure M(x) that approximates f(x), then there could still be room for improvement.
In this section, we consider a specific class of mechanisms that denoise the output of a Gaussian
mechanism. Let yˆ ∼ N (f(x), σ2I), we are interested in designing a post-processing function g
such that y˜ = g(yˆ) is closer to f(x) than yˆ. This class of mechanisms are of particular interest for
differential privacy because (1) since differential privacy is preserved by post-processing, releasing a
function y˜ = g(yˆ) of a differentially private output is again differentially private; (2) since information
about f and the distribution of the noise are publicly known, this information can be leveraged to
design denoising functions.
This is a statistical estimation problem, where f(x) is the underlying parameter and yˆ is the
data. Since in this case we are adding the noise ourselves, it is possible to use the classical statistical
theory on Gaussian models as is because the Gaussian assumption is now true by construction. This
is however an unusual estimation problem where all we observe is a single data point. Since yˆ is the
maximum likelihood estimator, if there is no additional information about f(x), we cannot hope
to improve the estimation error uniformly over all f(x) ∈ Rd. But there is still something we can
do when we consider either of the following assumptions: (A.1) x is drawn from some underlying
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distribution, thus inducing some distribution on f(x); or, (A.2) ‖f(x)‖p ≤ B for some p,B > 0,
where ‖ · ‖p is the Lp-norm (or pseudo-norm when p < 1).
Optimal Bayesian denoising. Assumption A.1 translates the problem of optimal denoising
into a Bayesian estimation problem, where the underlying parameter f(x) has a prior distribution,
and the task is to find an estimator that attains the Bayes risk — the minimum of the average
estimation error integrated over a prior pi, defined as
R(pi) = min
g:Rd→Rd
E
[
E[‖g(yˆ)− f(x)‖2|f(x)]] .
For square loss, the Bayes estimator is simply the posterior mean estimator, as the following theorem
shows:
Theorem 10. Let x ∼ pi and assume the induced distribution of f(x) is square integrable. Then
the Bayes estimator y˜Bayes is given by
y˜Bayes = argmin
g:Rd→Rd
E
[‖g(yˆ)− f(x)‖2] = E[f(x)|yˆ] .
The proof can be found in any standard statistics textbook [see, e.g., Lehmann and Casella, 2006].
One may ask what the corresponding MSE is and how much it improves over the version without
post-processing. The answer depends on the prior and the amount of noise added for differential
privacy. When f(x) ∼ N (0, w2I), the posterior mean estimator can be written analytically into
y˜Bayes = (w
2/(w2+σ2))yˆ, and the corresponding Bayes risk is E[‖y˜Bayes−f(x)‖2] = dw2σ2/(σ2+w2).
In other word, we get a factor of w2/(w2 + σ2) improvement over simply using yˆ.
In general, there is no analytical form for the posterior mean, but if we can evaluate the density
of f(x) or sample from the distribution of x, then we can obtain an arbitrarily good approximation
of y˜Bayes using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.
Optimal frequentist denoising. Assumption A.2 spells out a minimax estimation problem,
where the underlying parameter f(x) is assumed to be within a set S ⊂ Rd. In particular, we are
interested in finding y˜minimax that attains the minimax risk
R(S) = min
g:Rd→Rd
max
f(x)∈S
E
[‖g(yˆ)− f(x)‖2] ,
on Lp balls S = B(p,B) = {y ∈ Rd | ‖y‖p ≤ B} of radius B.
A complete characterization of this minimax risk (up to a constant) is given by Birge´ and
Massart [2001, Proposition 5], who show that in the non-trivial region2 of the signal to noise ratio
B/σ, the ball S = B(p,B) satisfies
R(S) = Θ
(
Bpσ2−p
(
1 + log
(
dσp
Bp
))1−p/2)
(7)
for 0 < p < 2 and when p ≥ 2, Donoho et al. [1990] show that
R(S) = Θ
(
B2σ2
σ2 +B2/d
)
.
2When
√
log d ≤ B/σ ≤ cpd1/p for a constant cp that depends only on p.
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Deriving exact minimax estimators is challenging and most analyses assume certain asymptotic
regimes (see the case for p = 2 by Bickel et al. [1981]). Nonetheless, some techniques have been
shown to match R(B(p,B)) up to a small constant factor in the finite sample regime [see, e.g.,
Donoho et al., 1990, Donoho and Johnstone, 1994]. This means that we can often improve the
square error from dσ2 to R(B(p,B)) when we have the additional information that f(x) is in some
Lp ball. This could be especially helpful in the high-dimensional case for p < 2. For instance if
p = 1 and B = σ, then we obtain a risk σB
√
1 + log(dσ/B), which improves exponentially in d
over the dσ2 risk of yˆ. More practically, if f(x) is a sparse histogram with s non-zero elements, then
taking p→ 0 will result in an error bound on the order of sσ2(1 + log(d)), which is linear in the
sparsity s rather than the dimension d.
Adaptive estimation. What if we do not know the prior parameter w2, or a right choice of B
and p? Can we still come up with estimators that take advantage of these structures? It turns
out that this is the problem of designing adaptive estimators which sits at the heart of statistical
research. An adaptive estimator in our case, is one that does not need to know w2 or a pair of B
and p, yet behave nearly as well as Bayes estimator that knows w2 or the minimax estimator that
knows B and p for each parameter regime.
We first give an example of an adaptive Bayes estimator that does not require us to specify a
prior, yet can perform almost as well as the optimal Bayes estimator for all isotropic Gaussian prior
simultaneously.
Theorem 11 (James-Stein estimator and its adaptivity). When d ≥ 3, substituting w2 in y˜Bayes
with its maximum likelihood estimate under
f(x) ∼ N (0, w2I) , yˆ|f(x) ∼ N (f(x), σ2I)
produces the James-Stein estimator
y˜JS =
(
1− (d− 2)σ
2
‖yˆ‖2
)
yˆ.
Moreover, it has an MSE
E
[‖y˜JS − f(x)‖2] = dσ2(1− (d− 2)2
d2
σ2
w2 + σ2
)
.
The James-Stein estimator has the property that it always improves the MLE yˆ when d ≥ 3
[Stein, 1956] and it always achieves a risk that is within a d2/(d− 2)2 multiplicative factor of the
Bayes risk of y˜Bayes for any w
2.
We now move on to describe a method that is adaptive to B and p in minimax estimation. Quite
remarkably, Donoho [1995] shows that choosing λ = σ
√
2 log d in the soft-thresholding estimator
y˜TH = sign(yˆ) max{0, |yˆ| − λ} (8)
yields a nearly optimal estimator for every Lp ball.
Theorem 12 (The adaptivity of soft-thresholding, Theorem 4.2 of [Donoho, 1995]). Let S = B(p,B)
for some p,B > 0. The soft-thresholding estimator with λ = σ
√
2 log d obeys that
sup
f(x)∈S
E
[‖y˜TH − f(x)‖2] ≤ (2 log d+ 1)(σ2 + 2.22R(S)) .
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The result implies that the soft-thresholding estimator is nearly optimal for all balls up to a
multiplicative factor of 4.44 log(d).
Thanks to the fact that we know the parameter σ exactly, both y˜JS and y˜TH are now completely
free of tuning parameters. Yet, they can achieve remarkable adaptivity that covers a large class
of model assumptions and function classes. A relatively small price to pay for such adaptivity is
that we might lose a constant (or a log(d)) factor. Whether such adaptivity is worth will vary on a
case-by-case basis.
Take the problem of private releasing a histogram of n items in d bins. Theorem 12 and Equation
(7) with p ≤ 1 imply that the soft-thresholding estimator obeys
E
[‖y˜TH − f(x)‖2] = O˜ (min{sσ2, n1/kσ2−1/k}) .
where s denotes the number of nonzero elements in f(x) and k is the largest power-law exponent
greater than 1 such that order statistics f(x)(d−i+1) ≤ ni−k for all i = 1, ..., d and O˜ hides logarithmic
factors in d, dσ/n. The fact that s ≤ d implies that the soft-thresholding estimator improves over
the naive private release for all d, n, s and the n1/k factor suggests that we can take advantage
of an unknown power law distribution even if the histogram is not really sparse. This makes our
technique effective in the many data mining problems where power law distributions occur naturally
[Faloutsos et al., 1999].
Related work. Denoising as a post-processing step in the context of differentially privacy is
not a new idea. Notably, Barak et al. [2007], Hay et al. [2009] show that a post-processing step
enforcing consistency of contingency table releases and graph degree sequences leads to more accurate
estimations. Williams and McSherry [2010] sets up the general statistical (Bayesian) inference
problem of DP releases by integrating auxiliary information (a prior). Karwa et al. [2016] exploits
knowledge of the noise distribution use to achieve DP in the inference procedure of a network
model and shows that it helps to preserve asymptotic efficiency. Nikolov et al. [2013] demonstrates
that projecting linear regression solutions to a known `1-ball improves the estimation error from
O(poly(d)) to O(polylog(d)) when the underlying ground truth is sparse. Bernstein et al. [2017]
uses Expectation–Maximization to denoise the parameters of a class of graphical models starting
from noisy empirical moments obtained using the Laplace mechanism.
In all the above references there is some prior knowledge (constraint sets, sparsity or Bayesian
prior) that is exploited to improve the utility of DP releases. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to consider “adaptive estimation” and demonstrate how classical techniques can be helpful
even without such prior knowledge. These estimators are not new; they have been known in the
statistics literature for decades. Our purpose is to compile facts that are relevant to the practice of
DP and initiate a systematic study of how these ideas affect the utility of DP mechanisms, which
we complement with the experimental evaluation presented in the next section.
5 Numerical Experiments
This section provides an experimental evaluation of the improvements in utility provided by optimal
calibration and adaptive denoising. First we numerically compare the variance of the analytic
Gaussian mechanism and the classical mechanism for a variety of privacy parameters. Then we
evaluate the contributions of denoising and analytic calibration against a series of baselines for the
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Figure 1: Two leftmost plots: Experiments comparing the classical Gaussian mechanism (cGM) and
the analytic Gaussian mechanism (aGM), in terms of their absolute standard deviations as ε→ 0,
and in terms of the gain in variance as a function of ε. Two rightmost plots: Mean estimation
experiments showing L2 error between the private mean estimate and the non-private empirical
mean as a function of the dimension d.
task of private mean estimation using synthetic data. We also evaluate several denoising strategies
on the task of releasing heat maps based on the New York City taxi dataset under differential
privacy. Further experiments are presented in Appendix B, including an evaluation of denoising
strategies for the task of private histogram release.
5.1 Analytic Gaussian Mechanism
We implemented Algorithm 1 in Python3 and ran experiments to compare the variance of the
perturbation obtained with the analytic Gaussian mechanism versus the variance required by the
classical Gaussian mechanism. In all our experiments the values of v∗ and u∗ were solved up to an
accuracy of 10−12 using binary search and the implementation of the erf function provided by SciPy
Jones et al. [2001].
The results are presented in the two leftmost panels in Figure 1. The plots show that as ε→ 0
the optimally calibrated perturbation outperforms the classical mechanism by several orders of
magnitude. Furthermore, we see that even for values of ε close to 1 our mechanism reduces the
variance by a factor of 1.4 or more, with higher improvements for larger values of δ.
5.2 Denoising for Mean Estimation
Our next experiment evaluates the utility of denoising combined with the analytical Gaussian
mechanism for the task of private mean estimation. The input to the mechanism is a dataset
x = (x1, . . . , xn) containing n vectors xi ∈ Rd and the underlying deterministic functionality is
f(x) = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 xi. This relatively simple task is a classic example from the family of linear
queries which are frequently considered in the differential privacy literature. We compare the
accuracy of several mechanisms M for releasing a private version of f(x) in terms of the Euclidean
distance ‖M(x) − f(x)‖2. In particular, we test the analytical Gaussian mechanism with either
James-Stein denoising cf. Theorem 11 (aGM-JS) or optimal thresholding denoising cf. Theorem 12
(aGM-TH), as well as several baselines including: the classical Gaussian mechanism (cGM), the
3See https://github.com/BorjaBalle/analytic-gaussian-mechanism.
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analytical Gaussian mechanism without denoising (aGM), and the Laplace mechanism (Lap) using
the same ε parameter as the Gaussian mechanisms.
To provide a thorough comparison we explore of the different parameters of the problem on the
final utility. The key parameters of the problem are the dimension d and the DP parameters ε and δ.
The dimension affects the utility through the bounds provided in Theorem 11 and Theorem 12. The
DP parameters affect the utility through the variance σ2 of the mechanism, which is also affected by
the sample size n via the global sensitivity. Thus, we can characterize the effect of σ2 by keeping n
fixed and changing the DP parameters. In our experiments we consider a fixed sample size n = 500
and privacy parameter δ = 10−4 while trying several values for ε.
The other parameter that affects the utility is the “size” of f(x), controlled either through
the variance w2 or the norm ball S. Since the denoising estimators we use are adaptive to these
parameters and do not need to know them in advance, we sample the dataset x repeatedly to obtain
a diversity of values for f(x). Each dataset x is sampled as follows: first sample a center x0 ∼ N (0, I)
and then build x = (x1, . . . , xn) with xi = x0+ξi, where each ξi is i.i.d. with independent coordinates
sampled uniformly from the interval [−1/2, 1/2]. Thus, in each dataset the points xi all lie in
an L∞-ball of radius 1, leading to a global L2 sensitivity ∆2 =
√
d/n and a global L1 sensitivity
∆1 = d/n. These are used to calibrate the Gaussian and Laplace perturbations, respectively.
The results are presented in two rightmost panels of Figure 1. Each point in every plot is the
result of averaging the error over 100 repetitions with different datasets. The first plot uses ε = 0.01
and shows how denoised methods improve the accuracy over all the other methods, sometimes
by orders of magnitude. The second plot shows that for this problem the James-Stein estimator
provides better accuracy in the high-dimensional setting.
5.3 New York City Taxi Heat Maps
In this section, we apply our method to New York City taxi data. The dataset is a collection of
time-stamped pick-ups and drop-offs of taxi drivers and we are interested in sharing a density map
of such pick-ups and drop-offs in Manhattan at a specific time of a specific day under differential
privacy.
This is a problem of significant practical interest. Ever since the NYC Taxi & Limousine
Commission released this dataset, there has been multiple independent reports concerning the security
and privacy risks this dataset poses for taxi drivers and their passengers [see, e.g., Pandurangan,
Douriez et al., 2016]. The techniques presented in this paper allow us to provably prevent individuals
(on both the per-trip level and per-cab level) in the dataset from being identified, while remarkably,
permitting the release of rich information about the data with fine-grained spatial and temporal
resolution.
Specifically, we apply the analytical Gaussian mechanism to release the number of picks-ups and
drop-offs at every traffic junction in Manhattan. There are a total of 3,784 such traffic junctions and
they are connected by 7,070 sections of roads. We will treat them as nodes and edges on a graph.
In the post-processing phase, we apply graph smoothing techniques to reveal the underlying signal
despite the noise due to aGM. Specifically, we compare the JS-estimator and the soft-thresholding
estimator we described in Section 4, as well as the same soft-thresholding estimator applied to the
coefficients of a graph wavelet transform due to Sharpnack et al. [2013]. The basis transformation is
important because the data might be sparser in the transformed domain. For reference, we also
include the state-of-the-art graph smoothing techniques called graph trend filtering [Wang et al.,
2016], which has one additional tuning parameter but has been shown to perform significantly better
11
-74 -73.98 -73.96 -73.94 -73.92
40.72
40.74
40.76
40.78
40.8
40.82
40.84
40.86
Time = 0:00
Ground truth
-74 -73.98 -73.96 -73.94 -73.92
40.72
40.74
40.76
40.78
40.8
40.82
40.84
40.86
Time = 0:00
Raw aGM
RMSE = 40.29
-74 -73.98 -73.96 -73.94 -73.92
40.72
40.74
40.76
40.78
40.8
40.82
40.84
40.86
Time = 0:00
Wavelets
RMSE = 12.28
-74 -73.98 -73.96 -73.94 -73.92
40.72
40.74
40.76
40.78
40.8
40.82
40.84
40.86
Time = 0:00
Trend filtering
RMSE = 10.07
Figure 2: Illustration of the denoising in differentially private release of NYC taxi density during 00:00
- 01:00 am Sept 24, 2014. From left to right, the figures represent the true data, the output of the
analytical Gaussian mechanism, the reconstructed signal from soft-thresholded wavelet coefficients
with spanning-tree wavelet transform [Sharpnack et al., 2013], and the results of trend filtering
on graphs [Wang et al., 2016]. We observe that adding appropriate post-processing significantly
reduces the estimation error and also makes the underlying structures visible.
than wavelet smoothing in practice.
Our experiments provide cab-level differential privacy by assuming that every driver does a
maximum of 5 trips within an hour so that we have a global L2-sensitivity of ∆ = 5. This is a
conservative but reasonable estimate and can be enforced by preprocessing the data. Data within
each hour is gathered and distributed to each traffic junction using a kernel density estimator;
further details are documented in Doraiswamy et al. [2014].
We present some qualitative comparisons in Figure 2, where we visualize the privately released
heat map with and without post-processing. Relatively speaking, trend filtering performs better
than wavelet smoothing, but both approaches significantly improves the RMSE over the DP release
without post-processing. The results in Appendix B provide quantitative results by comparing
the mean square error of cGM, aGM as well as the aforementioned denoising techniques for data
corresponding to different time intervals.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we embark on a journey of pushing the utility limit of Gaussian mechanism for
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. We propose a novel method to obtain the optimal calibration of Gaussian
perturbations required to attain a given DP guarantee. We also review decades of research in
statistical estimation theory and show that combining these techniques with differential privacy one
obtains powerful adaptivity that denoises differentially private outputs nearly optimally without
additional hyperparameters. On synthetic data and on the New York City Taxi dataset we illustrate
a significant gain in estimation error and fine-grained spatial-temporal resolution.
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There are a number of theoretical problems of interest for future work. First, on the problem
of differentially private estimation. Our post-processing approach effectively restricts our choice
of algorithms to the composition of privacy release and post-processing. While we now know that
we are optimal in both components, it is unclear whether we lose anything relative to the best
differentially private algorithms. Secondly, the analytical calibration proposed in this paper is
optimal for achieving (ε, δ)-DP with Gaussian noise. But when building complex mechanisms we
are stuck in the dilemma of choosing between (a) using the aGM with the advanced composition
[Kairouz et al., 2015]; or, (b) using Re´nyi DP [Mironov, 2017] or zCDP [Bun and Steinke, 2016]
for tighter composition and calculate the (ε, δ) from moment bounds. While (a) is tighter in the
calculation the privacy parameters of each intermediate value, (b) is tighter in the composition but
cannot take advantage of aGM. It would be interesting if we could get the best of both worlds.
Acknowledgments
We thank Doraiswamy et al. [2014] for sharing their preprocessed NYC taxi dataset, the anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments that led to improvements of the paper and Stephen E. Fienberg for
discussions that inspired the authors to think about optimal post-processing.
References
Mart´ın Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian Goodfellow, H Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov, Kunal Talwar, and
Li Zhang. Deep learning with differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 308–318. ACM, 2016.
Boaz Barak, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Cynthia Dwork, Satyen Kale, Frank McSherry, and Kunal
Talwar. Privacy, accuracy, and consistency too: a holistic solution to contingency table release.
In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of
database systems, pages 273–282. ACM, 2007.
Raef Bassily, Adam Smith, and Abhradeep Thakurta. Private empirical risk minimization: Efficient
algorithms and tight error bounds. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2014 IEEE
55th Annual Symposium on, pages 464–473. IEEE, 2014.
Garrett Bernstein, Ryan McKenna, Tao Sun, Daniel Sheldon, Michael Hay, and Gerome Miklau.
Differentially private learning of undirected graphical models using collective graphical models.
In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2017.
PJ Bickel et al. Minimax estimation of the mean of a normal distribution when the parameter space
is restricted. The Annals of Statistics, 9(6):1301–1309, 1981.
Lucien Birge´ and Pascal Massart. Gaussian model selection. Journal of the European Mathematical
Society, 3(3):203–268, 2001.
Mark Bun and Thomas Steinke. Concentrated differential privacy: Simplifications, extensions, and
lower bounds. In Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 635–658. Springer, 2016.
David L Donoho. De-noising by soft-thresholding. IEEE transactions on information theory, 41(3):
613–627, 1995.
13
David L Donoho and Iain M Johnstone. Minimax risk over p-balls for p-error. Probability Theory
and Related Fields, 99(2):277–303, 1994.
David L Donoho, Richard C Liu, and Brenda MacGibbon. Minimax risk over hyperrectangles, and
implications. The Annals of Statistics, pages 1416–1437, 1990.
Harish Doraiswamy, Nivan Ferreira, Theodoros Damoulas, Juliana Freire, and Cla´udio T Silva.
Using topological analysis to support event-guided exploration in urban data. IEEE transactions
on visualization and computer graphics, 20(12):2634–2643, 2014.
Marie Douriez, Harish Doraiswamy, Juliana Freire, and Cla´udio T Silva. Anonymizing nyc taxi data:
Does it matter? In Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA), 2016 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 140–148. IEEE, 2016.
Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Foundations
and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3-4):211–407, 2014.
Cynthia Dwork and Guy N Rothblum. Concentrated differential privacy. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1603.01887, 2016.
Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity
in private data analysis. In Theory of cryptography, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, Omer Reingold, Guy N Rothblum, and Salil Vadhan. On the complexity
of differentially private data release: efficient algorithms and hardness results. In Proceedings of
the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 381–390. ACM, 2009.
Michalis Faloutsos, Petros Faloutsos, and Christos Faloutsos. On power-law relationships of the
internet topology. In ACM SIGCOMM computer communication review, volume 29, pages 251–262.
ACM, 1999.
Robert D Gordon. Values of mills’ ratio of area to bounding ordinate and of the normal probability
integral for large values of the argument. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 12(3):364–366,
1941.
Michael Hay, Chao Li, Gerome Miklau, and David Jensen. Accurate estimation of the degree
distribution of private networks. In Data Mining, 2009. ICDM’09. Ninth IEEE International
Conference on, pages 169–178. IEEE, 2009.
Eric Jones, Travis Oliphant, Pearu Peterson, et al. SciPy: Open source scientific tools for Python,
2001. URL http://www.scipy.org/.
Peter Kairouz, Sewoong Oh, and Pramod Viswanath. The composition theorem for differential
privacy. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2015.
Vishesh Karwa, Aleksandra Slavkovic´, et al. Inference using noisy degrees: Differentially private
β-model and synthetic graphs. The Annals of Statistics, 44(1):87–112, 2016.
Erich L Lehmann and George Casella. Theory of point estimation. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2006.
14
Min Lyu, Dong Su, and Ninghui Li. Understanding the sparse vector technique for differential
privacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 10(6):637–648, 2017.
Ilya Mironov. Renyi differential privacy. In Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF),
2017 IEEE 30th, pages 263–275. IEEE, 2017.
Aleksandar Nikolov, Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. The geometry of differential privacy: the sparse
and approximate cases. In Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 351–360. ACM, 2013.
Vijay Pandurangan. On taxi and rainbows. https://tech.vijayp.ca/
of-taxis-and-rainbows-f6bc289679a1. Accessed: 2014-06-21.
Ryan M Rogers, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman, and Salil Vadhan. Privacy odometers and filters:
Pay-as-you-go composition. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1921–
1929, 2016.
James Sharpnack, Aarti Singh, and Akshay Krishnamurthy. Detecting activations over graphs using
spanning tree wavelet bases. In Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 536–544, 2013.
Charles Stein. Inadmissibility of the usual estimator for the mean of a multivariate normal
distribution. In Proceedings of the Third Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and
probability, volume 1, pages 197–206, 1956.
Matus Telgarsky. Dirichlet draws are sparse with high probability. CoRR, abs/1301.4917, 2013.
Yu-Xiang Wang, James Sharpnack, Alexander J. Smola, and Ryan J. Tibshirani. Trend filtering on
graphs. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 17(105):1–41, 2016.
Oliver Williams and Frank McSherry. Probabilistic inference and differential privacy. In Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2451–2459, 2010.
15
A Proofs
In this appendix we present supporting proofs for all the results mentioned in the main text.
A.1 Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Theorem 2. An simple way to see that (0, δ)-DP is achievable with Gaussian noise is to
recall that (0, δ)-DP is equivalent to a bound of δ on the total variation (TV) distance between the
output distributions of M(x) and M(x′) for any neighbouring pair x ' x′. If M(x) is an output
perturbation mechanism for f(x) with noise Z ∼ N (0, σ2I), then using Pinsker’s inequality we have
TV(M(x),M(x′)) ≤
√
KL(M(x)|M(x′))
2
=
√
KL(N (f(x), σ2I)|N (f(x′), σ2I))
2
=
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖
2σ
≤ ∆
2σ
.
Thus, we see that a Gaussian perturbation with standard deviation σ = ∆/2δ is enough to achieve
(0, δ)-DP.
Proof of Theorem 4. Note that the proof of Theorem 9 shows that a Gaussian perturbation with
σ = ∆/
√
2ε yields a (ε, δ0(ε))-DP mechanism, where δ0(ε) = Φ(0) − eεΦ(−
√
2ε). Thus, it is not
possible to attain (ε, δ)-DP with δ < δ0(ε) without increasing the variance of the perturbation.
The result follows by showing that the upper bound for δ proposed in Theorem 4 is a lower
bound for δ0(ε). Since Φ(0) = 1/2, all we need to show is e
εΦ(−√2ε) < e−3ε√
4piε
.
Let Φc(t) = P[N (0, 1) ≥ t] = 1−Φ(t) be the complementary of the standard Gaussian CDF. The
Mill’s ratio for the Gaussian distribution is the quantity r(t) =
√
2piet
2/2Φc(t). Bounding the Mill’s
ratio is a standard approach to approximate the tail of the Gaussian distribution. A well-known
bound for the Mill’s ratio is Gordon’s inequality r(t) < 1/t Gordon [1941]. By using the symmetry
Φ(−t) = Φc(t) we obtain :
eεΦ(−
√
2ε) = eεΦc(
√
2ε) =
e−3ε√
2pi
r(
√
2ε) <
e−3ε√
4piε
.
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that the density of the Gaussian output perturbation mechanism M(x) =
f(x) +Z with Z ∼ N (0, σ2I) is given by pM(x)(y) = exp(−‖y− f(x)‖2/2σ2)/
√
2piσ2. Plugging this
expression into the definition of the privacy loss function and performing a quick computation we
get
`M,x,x′(y) =
‖y − f(x′)‖2 − ‖y − f(x)‖2
2σ2
=
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖2
2σ2
+
〈y − f(x), f(x)− f(x′)〉
σ2
.
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To compute the privacy loss random variable LM,x,x′ we need to plug Y = f(x) + Z with Z ∼
N (0, σ2I) in the above inner product. By observing that 〈Z, f(x)−f(x′)〉 ∼ N (0, σ2‖f(x)−f(x′)‖2)
we obtain the distribution of the privacy loss random variable is given by
LM,x,x′ ∼ N
(‖f(x)− f(x′)‖2
2σ2
,
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖2
σ2
)
.
Therefore, the privacy loss of the Gaussian mechanism has the form N (η, 2η) for η = D2/2σ2.
A.2 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 5. Given a pair of neighbouring datasets x ' x′ let p = pM(x) and p′ = pM(x′) be
the densities of the output random variables Y = M(x) and Y ′ = M(x′). Note that given an event
E ⊆ Y one can rewrite (1) as follows:∫
E
(p(y)− eεp′(y)) ≤ δ . (9)
Defining the event E∗ = {y : p(y) ≥ eεp′(y)} and its complementary E¯∗ = Y \ E∗, we can partition
E into the sets E+ = E ∩ E∗ and E− = E ∩ E¯∗. Therefore, by the definition of E∗ we have∫
E
(p(y)− eεp′(y)) =
∫
E+
(p(y)− eεp′(y))
+
∫
E−
(p(y)− eεp′(y))
≤
∫
E+
(p(y)− eεp′(y))
≤
∫
E∗
(p(y)− eεp′(y)) .
Because (9) has to hold for any event E and the upper bound above holds for any event, we conclude
that M is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if ∫
E∗
(p(y)− eεp′(y)) ≤ δ (10)
holds for any x ' x′. To complete the proof we need to show that (10) is equivalent to (3).
Expanding the definition of LM,x,x′ we get:
P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε] = P[log(p(Y )/p′(Y )) ≥ ε]
= P[p(Y ) ≥ eεp′(Y )]
=
∫
Y
1[p(y) ≥ eεp′(y)]p(y)
=
∫
E∗
p(y) .
A similar argument with LM,x′,x also shows:
P[LM,x′,x ≤ −ε] =
∫
E∗
p′(y) .
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Putting the last two equations together we obtain see that the left hand side of (3) equals the left
hand side of (10).
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that Lemma 3 shows that the privacy loss random variables LM,x,x′ and
LM,x′x both follow the same distribution N (η, 2η) with η = D2/2σ2. This allows us to write the
left hand side of (4) in terms of the Gaussian CDF Φ as follows:
P[LM,x,x′ ≥ ε] = P[N (η, 2η) ≥ ε]
= P
[
N (0, 1) ≥ −η + ε√
2η
]
= P
[
N (0, 1) ≤ η − ε√
2η
]
= Φ
(√
η
2
− ε√
2η
)
= Φ
(
D
2σ
− εσ
D
)
,
where we used N (η, 2η) = η +N (0, 1)/√2η and the symmetry P[N (0, 1) ≥ t] = P[N (0, 1) ≤ −t] of
the distribution of the Gaussian distribution around its mean. A similar argument applied to the
left hand side of (5) yields:
P[LM,x′,x ≤ −ε] = Φ
(
−D
2σ
− εσ
D
)
.
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove the result by using Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the integral
sign to show that the function of interest has non-negative derivatives. First note that from the
derivation of (4) we have
P[N (η, 2η) ≥ ε] = Φ(a(η)) = 1√
2pi
∫ a(η)
−∞
e−y
2/2dy ,
where a(η) =
√
η/2− ε/√2η. Now we can use Leibniz’s rule to write
d
dη
∫ a(η)
−∞
e−y
2/2dy = e−a(η)
2/2a′(η)
= e−a(η)
2/2
(
1√
8η
+
ε√
8η3
)
.
Similarly, for the second term in the function we have P[N (η, 2η) ≤ −ε] = Φ(b(η)) where b(η) =
−√η/2− ε/√2η. Using Leibniz’s rule again we get
d
dη
∫ b(η)
−∞
e−y
2/2dy = e−b(η)
2/2
(
− 1√
8η
+
ε√
8η3
)
.
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Therefore, we see that the derivative of h satisfies:
h′(η) =
1
4
√
piη
(
e−a(η)
2/2 + eεe−b(η)
2/2
)
+
ε
4
√
piη3
(
e−a(η)
2/2 − eεe−b(η)2/2
)
=
1
4
√
piη
(
e−a(η)
2/2 + eεe−b(η)
2/2
)
≥ 0 ,
where we used that a(η)2 + 2ε = b(η)2.
Proof of Theorem 9. Recall that the derivations in Section 3 establish that in order to calibrate a
Gaussian perturbation to achieve (ε, δ)-DP all that is required is find the smallest σ such that
Φ
(
∆
2σ
− εσ
∆
)
− eεΦ
(
−∆
2σ
− εσ
∆
)
≤ δ . (11)
To establish the correctness of the analytic Gaussian mechanism we begin by observing that the
argument in the first term of (11) changes sign at σ = ∆/
√
2ε, while the argument for the second
terms is always negative. Thus, we substitute σ = α∆/
√
2ε in the expression above and obtain:
Bε(α) = Φ
(√
ε
2
(
1
α
− α
))
− eεΦ
(
−
√
ε
2
(
1
α
+ α
))
.
To solve the optimization inf{α > 0 : Bε(α) ≤ δ} using numerical evaluations of Φ it is convenient
to consider the cases α ≥ 1 and α < 1 separately. In the case α ≥ 1 we define u = (α − 1/α)2/2
and substitute the corresponding α in Bε to obtain
B−ε (u) = Φ(−
√
εu)− eεΦ(−
√
ε(u+ 2)) .
Similarly, by taking v = (1/α− α)2/2 in the case α < 1 we obtain
B+ε (v) = Φ(
√
εv)− eεΦ(−
√
ε(v + 2)) .
Note that, as expected, these definitions satisfy limv→∞B+ε (v) = 1 and limu→∞B−ε (u) = 0, since
the limits correspond to limα→0B(α) = 1 and limα→∞B(α) = 0, respectively. Furthermore, we
have
B+ε (0) = B
−
ε (0) = Φ(0)− eεΦ(−
√
2ε) = δ0(ε) ,
which corresponds to the privacy guarantee (ε, δ0(ε))-DP obtained by taking σ = ∆/
√
2ε; i.e. α = 1.
These observations motivate the mechanism described in Algorithm 1. In particular, for δ ≥ δ0(ε)
we can achieve (ε, δ)-DP with α < 1, and the smallest α < 1 such that Bε(α) ≤ δ corresponds to
the largest v ≥ 0 such that B+ε (v) ≤ δ. Similarly, for δ < δ0(ε) we require α ≥ 1, and the smallest
α ≥ 1 such that Bε(α) ≤ δ corresponds to the smallest u ≥ 0 such that B−ε (u) ≤ δ.
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A.3 Proofs from Section 4
The proofs in this section are well-known and not part of the contribution of the current paper. We
include these proofs because they are short and revealing and we hope to be self-contained as much
as possible.
Proof of Theorem 10. Let P be the distribution of f(x) induced by x ∼ pi. Let θ ∈ Rd, define its
posterior error
r(θ|yˆ) =
∫
‖θ − f(x)‖2dP (f(x)|yˆ).
Take the gradient with respect to θ on both sides and apply Fubini’s theorem
∂
∂θ
r(θ|yˆ) = ∂
∂θ
∫
‖θ − f(x)‖2dP (f(x)|yˆ)
=2θ − 2
∫
f(x)dP (f(x)|yˆ) = 2(θ − E[f(x)|yˆ]).
Assign the gradient to 0 we get that the minimizer is E[f(x)|yˆ].
Now, assume y˜Bayes is suboptimal, there exists y˜
∗ 6= y˜Bayes such that
E
[‖f(x)− y˜Bayes‖2] > E [‖f(x)− y˜∗‖2]
= E[r(y˜∗|yˆ)] ≥ E[r(y˜Bayes)] = E
[‖f(x)− y˜Bayes‖2] .
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 11. Note that ‖yˆ‖
2
w2+σ2
follows a χ2 distribution with degree of freedom d. The
likelihood function
p(‖yˆ‖2|w2) ∝ ( ‖yˆ‖
2
w2 + σ2
)d/2−1e−
‖yˆ‖2
2(w2+σ2) .
The gradient w.r.t. w2 of the log-likelihood, we get
− d/2− 1
w2 + σ2
+
‖y‖2
2(w2 + σ2)2
.
Assigning it to 0, we get the maximum likelihood estimate w2 = ‖y‖
2
k−2 − σ2. Substituting it into
y˜Bayes = (w
2/(w2+σ2))yˆ produces y˜JS as stated and the calculation of its MSE is straightforward.
B Additional Experiments
Here we present additional experimental results. Figure 3 provides more plots for the setups explored
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The next two sections present further experiments on a sparse histogram
denoising task and on the New York City taxi dataset.
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Figure 3: Left plot: Comparing the classical Gaussian mechanism (cGM) and the analytic Gaussian
mechanism (aGM) in terms of gain in variance as a function of δ. Two rightmost plots: Mean
estimation experiments showing L2 error between the private mean estimate and the non-private
empirical mean as a function of the dimension d with ε = 1 and ε = 0.1. Dataset size is fixed to
n = 500 and privacy parameter is set to δ = 10−4.
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Figure 4: Histogram release experiments showing L1 error between the private histogram and the
non-private empirical histogram as a function of the dimension d. Dataset size is fixed to n = 500
and privacy parameter is set to δ = 10−4. The first three panels correspond to ε = 1, 0.1, 0.01 (left
to right). The rightmost panel displays the two denoised mechanisms (aGM-JS and aGM-TH) in
the high-dimensional case.
B.1 Denoising for Histogram Release
We evaluate the accuracy of our new Gaussian perturbation mechanisms on a second task involving
private histogram release. In this problem the dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn) contains elements xi ∈ [d]
from a finite set with d. The deterministic functionality is the empirical histogram y = f(x) ∈ Rd
where yj = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 I[xi = j]. In this case the global L2 sensitivity ∆2 =
√
2/n and a global L1
sensitivity ∆1 = 2/n (with respect to replacing one individual in a dataset by another arbitrary
individual).
For this task, each dataset is sampled from a multinomial distribution with parameters sampled
from a symmetric Dirichlet with α = 1/d. The parameters are resampled for each individual
experiment. The choice of α guarantees that the resulting histograms are highly sparse Telgarsky
[2013]. Our setup follows the same structure as the one for the experiments from previous section.
The results are presented in Figure 4. We observe that in this problem the Laplace mechanism
is better than the classical Gaussian mechanism, and in the setting ε = 1 it is even better than
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Figure 5: Illustration of the denoising in differentially private release of NYC taxi density during
12:00 - 13:00 pm Sept 24, 2014. Comparing to the figure in the midnight of Figure 2, the figures
look structurally different. More activities center around the midtown and upper west sides.
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Figure 6: Experiments for releasing NYC taxi heat maps. The plots compare the MSE of the
reeased heat map as a function of the privacy loss parameter ε. We take ∆ = 5 and δ = 10−6 for all
experiments. The wavelet basis is generated using Sharpnack et al. [2013] and the soft-thresholding’s
hyperparameter is chosen as σ
√
2 log d.
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the analytic Gaussian mechanism, with and without denoising. However, as we decrease ε the
utility of the analytic Gaussian mechanism becomes better than that of the Laplace mechanism,
and denoising provides a significant advantage over mechanisms without denoising. Finally, we note
that due to the sparsity of the underlying datapoint, denoising via soft thresholding provides better
utility in this case than denoising via shrinking.
B.2 New York City Taxi Heat Maps
Here we present a second qualitative experiment with the New York City taxi dataset. The difference
with the previous experiment is that we use data for a different time of the same day, leading to a
different structure in the activities around the city; see Figure 2. This illustrates that the selected
denoising methods are adaptive to the structure of the underlying data.
Furthermore, Figure 6 presents quantitative results where we compare the mean square error
(MSE) of cGM, aGM as well as the aforementioned denoising techniques. As we can see, on the real
datasets, aGM always improves over cGM by a constant factor and denoising techniques are able to
leverage bias-variance trade-off and improve the recovery in MSE further. The benefits of denoising
range from orders of magnitude (in the case when ε is tiny) to a small constant factor (when ε is
moderate). In the low-privacy regime (e.g., ε > 5), soft-thresholding performs a little worse than
not using it at all. This is the expected cost of adaptivity and it does appear in its error bound.
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